Welfare—Judicial Responsibility in Welfare Cases by unknown
Urban Law Annual ; Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law
Volume 8
January 1974
Welfare—Judicial Responsibility in Welfare Cases
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw
Part of the Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Urban Law Annual ; Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship.
For more information, please contact digital@wumail.wustl.edu.
Recommended Citation
Welfare—Judicial Responsibility in Welfare Cases, 8 Urb. L. Ann. 299 (1974)
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol8/iss1/18
JUDICIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN WELFARE CASES
Two experimental work projects were approved by the Secretary of
Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) for implementation in certain
selected areas of New York State.' These projects required employable
members of families receiving public assistance under the Aid to Fami-
lies with Dependent Children (AFDC) program 2 in those areas to
register for employment training and placement.3 The formulation of
the experimental work projects was a response to growing public and
legislative hostility that threatened to result in a massive decrease in
state AFDC funds.-
In Aguayo v. Richardsons appellants sought to enjoin New York
State from implementing these state work projects on the grounds that
the limited geographic basis6 for their implementation violated equal
protection requirements and that the federal approval of the programs
was invalid. Following a lengthy discussion of preliminary issues, in-
cluding the validity of the Secretary's approval of the projects,7 the
1. 42 U.S.c. § 1315 (1970) is the demonstration project provision of the
Social Security Act authorizing the approval of experimental programs. This sec-
tion allows the Secretary to waive compliance with requirements of 42 U.S.C. §
602 (Supp. II, 1972) "to the extent and for the period he finds necessary to
enable [a state] to carry out such [an experimental] project," if in his judgment
the experimental project "is likely to assist in promoting the objectives" of the
Social Security Act. This includes waiver of the requirement that a state plan for
AFDC "shall be in effect in all political subdivisions of the State .... ." 42 U.S.C.
§ 602(a) (1) (Supp. II, 1972).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-08 (1970). For a discussion of the background and scope
of the AFDC program see King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
3. N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 131 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
4. Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090, 1103 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
Aguayo v. Weinberger, 414 U.S. 1146 (1974).
5. 473 F.2d 1090 (2d Cir. 1973).
6. The State of New York sought to implement the projects in 14 welfare dis-
tricts in New York City, two counties in the New York City metropolitan area,
three upstate urban areas, and six counties throughout the State. Id. at 1094.
The project areas apparently were chosen to provide a mixture of urban, suburban
and rural welfare areas for assessing the impact and feasibility of the experimental
projects.
7. Appellants claimed that the Secretary of HEW had exceeded his authority
under 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (1970) in approving the experimental programs be-
cause: (1) the projects were not likely to assist in promoting the objectives of the
Social Security Act; (2) 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (1970) does not permit the Secretary
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Second Circuit Court of Appeals modifieds and affirmed a prior district
court denial of injunctive relief. 9
The work relief projects, Public Services Work Opportunities Pro-
gram (PSWOP) and Incentives for Independence (IFI), were devel-
oped by the State and approved by HEW on a one-year trial basis.10
PSWOP, comprised of a number of urban, suburban and rural welfare
to waive any requirements that might lessen or deny statutory rights or entitle-
ments; (3) the Secretary granted his approval on the basis of inadequate informa-
tion; (4) the projects cannot succeed; and (5) the approval did not expressly
waive compliance with the federal Work Incentive Program (WIN), 42 U.S.C. §
630 et seq. (Supp. II, 1972). 473 F.2d at 1103-05, 1107-08. The court of appeals
found that the Secretary had not exceeded his authority in approving the projects,
noting, inter alia, that the Secretary was required only to exercise his "judgment"
that the projects would further the objectives of the AFDC program and that the
purposes of the New York projects were clearly within the purview of the pur-
poses of the Social Security Act. Id. at 1105. The court also noted that the proj-
ects were not useless merely because the projects might not succeed; in fact,
"[a]scertainment by actual demonstration [that the program could not work]
would itself be a legitimate objective." Id. at 1106. The court also determined that
the Secretary could "take into account the growing antagonism to the welfare sys-
tem [and the need to satisfy the public] that every reasonable effort [was] being
made to induce employable recipients of assistance to work . . . ." Id. at 1103.
Appellants' last objection was based on Dublino v. New York State Dep't of
Social Serv., 348 F. Supp. 290 (W.D.N.Y. 1972), which held that the so-called
New York Work Rules were pre-empted by the federal WIN program. The
Supreme Court recently reversed this holding as to the pre-emption issue, while
remanding the case to the district court on questions of conflict between cer-
tain state provisions and federal WIN requirements. New York State Dep't of
Social Serv. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973). For a discussion of the WIN pro-
gram and its purposes see Graham, Public Assistance: Congress and the Employ-
able Mother, 3 U. RicHMIOND L. REv. 223 (1969); Comment, Public Welfare
"WIN" Program: Armtwisting Incentives, 117 U. PA. L. Rav. 1062 (1969).
8. The modification pertained to the 30-day suspension of benefits for refusal to
participate in the experimental programs. Concerned with possible due process
problems and cognizant of the serious impact of such a suspension requirement,
the court of appeals temporarily enjoined the requirement. The court required a
more thorough and deliberate investigation of the questions going to the merits of
the suspension requirement. 473 F.2d at 1112.
9. Aguayo v. Richardson, 352 F. Supp. 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
10. IFI was developed pursuant to N.Y. Soo. SERv. LAW § 29-a (McKinney
Supp. 1972). The statutory authorization of PSWOP is unclear. The program does
not fit within the requirements of § 29-a, but the State seemed to rely on N.Y. Soa.
SERv. LAW § 350-k (McKinney Supp. 1972). The court interpreted § 350-k as
providing for a statewide program, but since PSWOP's statutory authorization was
not questioned, the court declined to raise the issue itself and joined the parties in
assuming that the program was properly authorized under state law. 473 F.2d at
1094 n.2. For authorization of HEW's approval see notes 1, 7 supra.
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districts," provided employment for "employable" 12 AFDC recipients
for whom regular private- and public-sector jobs and training were
unavailable and could not be developed. Employment under PSWOP
could include work for any state or local agency located in the recip-
ient's county. PSWOP workers could not displace persons who were or
otherwise might have been employed by the state. They could, how-
ever, perform work "which, because of budgetary problems or other-
wise, would not be undertaken except for PSWOP.""3 Additionally,
PSWOP required provision for child care arrangements, 14 reimburse-
ments for certain work-related expenses, 1 and limitations on earningsg
and wage rates. 7 The contemplated sanction for nonparticipation by
eligible recipients was a 30-day suspension of benefits.' s
The IFI project" was substantially identical to PSWOP in its work
11. For the geographical makeup of PSWOP see note 6 supra. Approximately
25% of the State's AFDC recipients resided in the areas included in the PSWOP
program.
12. For "employability" definitions see N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 131 (McKinney
Supp. 1972). Two additional exemptions from PSWOP participation included
mothers or relatives caring for children under six years of age, and mothers or
female caretakers of children if the father or other male relative in the home was
registered for PSWOP. 473 F.2d at 1094 n.3.
13. 473 F.2d at 1094.
14. No eligible AFDC recipient could participate unless satisfactory child-care
arrangements were made. Id. at 1095.
15. See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw §§ 131-f, 350-k(6) (a), (b) (McKinney Supp.
1972). It is unclear what expenses actually would be reimbursed. Appellants
charged that participation in PSWOP would result in a net reduction in income
because the State would not reimburse for such items as cold-weather clothing,
shoes or personal grooming items. 473 F.2d at 1095 n.4. 18 N.Y.C.R.R. §
385.10 (e) (5) (1972) provided for reimbursement for transportation and lunches
only "when essential to enable a recipient to participate in the work relief pro-
gram;" such allowances were not to exceed $40 per month nor one dollar
per day for lunch.
16. PSWOP earnings could not exceed the amount of a recipient's regular AFDC
benefits. 473 F.2d at 1095. This requirement suggests that there was no actual work
"incentive" under this program. Rather it was negative inducement; work or risk a
loss of AFDC benefits. See notes 63, 65 inira.
17. The hourly rate for PSWOP work was the state minimum wage or the wage
paid to state employees for comparable work, whichever was higher. Also, there
was a 40-hour work week maximum. 473 F.2d at 1095.
18. 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 385.7 (1972). The suspension requirement was enjoined
by the court. See note 8 supra.
19. IFI involved 2.5% of the state's AFDC and Home Relief recipients and was
implemented in three rural, suburban and urban welfare districts within or co-
extensive with the PSWOP areas. 473 F.2d at 1095.
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obligations and benefits. IFI provided, however, full-time employment,
full wages, and all fringe benefits normally received by state employees.
In addition, a certain portion of a participant's IFI earnings were dis-
regarded in determining eligibility for supplementary AFDC grants. 2 0
The overall effect was a possible increase in net income. The sanction
for nonparticipation in IFI was a straight $66 per month reduction
in AFDG benefits.21
In recent years, welfare litigation aimed at state AFDC programs
has centered around two major issues. First, state AFDC eligibility re-
quirements have been attacked for excluding from state programs per-
sons otherwise eligible under federal AFDC requirements.22 Secondly,
the programs and their requirements have been attacked on the consti-
tutional ground of violating equal protection.23
In the exclusion cases the courts, under federal supremacy clause
theories, are willing to strike down state eligibility requirements that
do not conform to federal AFDC requirements. 2' The courts recognize
20. Id. at 1096.
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968); Woolfolk v. Brown, 325 F.
Supp. 1162 (E.D. Va. 1971), aff'd, 456 F.2d 652 (4th Cir. 1972). The Social
Security Act provides that a child is eligible for and entitled to AFDC benefits if
he is "needy" and "dependent."' 42 U.S.C. § 601 et seq. (1970). 42 U.S.C. §
602(a) (10) (Supp. II, 1972) further provides that AFDC assistance "shall be
furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals." (Emphasis
added.) 42 U.S.C. § 606 (1970) furnishes definitions of terms used in the federal
legislation.
23. See, e.g., Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970); King v. Smith, 392 U.S.
309 (1968); Hagans v. Wyman, 471 F.2d 347 (2d Cir. 1973); Jefferies v. Sugar-
man, 345 F. Supp. 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
24. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2; see, e.g., Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598
(1972) (holding invalid California's restriction on the federal "continued absence"
requirement); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968) (holding invalid Alabama's
"substitute father" regulation); X v. McCorkle, 333 F. Supp. 1109 (D.N.J. 1970)
(holding invalid New Jersey regulations that did not provide for "income disregard"
as required by federal regulations); Woolfolk v. Brown, 325 F. Supp. 1162 (E.D.
Va. 1971), aff'd, 456 F.2d 652 (4th Cir. 1972) (holding Virginia's work rule in-
valid for inconsistency with the federal WIN program); cf. Rosado v. Wyman,
397 U.S. 397 (1970) (holding that a state cannot alter its standard of need com-
putation in order to avoid a federal requirement). See also Comment, AFDC
Eligibility Requirements Unrelated to Need: The Impact of King v. Smith, 118
U. PA. L. REv. 1219 (1970).
"The plain language, legislative history, and purposes of the Act malke clear that
so long as one is needy and qualifies . . . within the meaning of § 406, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 606, no further restriction on eligibility for assistance is permissible." Lopez v.
Vowell, 471 F.2d 690, 693 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 939 (1973).
[Vol. 9:299
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that states "may to some extent vary their eligibility requirements
from federal standards" 25 and that states have a valid interest in pre-
serving the fiscal integrity of their programs that are supported by
limited AFDC resources.28 This state interest, however, may not be
protected by violating federal eligibility standards.2-
In the equal protection cases, however, the courts generally are un-
willing to strike down state welfare programs.25 These decisions con-
sistently follow the rationale and standards set forth in Dandridge v.
Williams.20 While not entirely insensitive to the fact that "public
welfare assistance ... involves the most basic economic needs of im-
poverished human beings,"30 the Dandridge Court found that the clas-
sification involved was rationally related to "the Stat&s legitimate in-
terest in encouraging employment and in avoiding discrimination
between welfare families and the families of the working poor."31 The
Court stated:
25. Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 286 (1971).
26. Id. at 291.
27. Id. The state's economic interest can be protected by its power to set the
level of benefits and the standard of need. See, e.g., King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309,
334 (1968); Comment, AFDC Eligibility Requirements Unrelated to Need, supra
note 24, at 1241-42.
28. See cases cited note 23 supra. This observation holds true despite the Su-
preme Court's earlier decisions in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), and
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). Dicta in Shapiro and Justice Harlan's
interpretation of the majority opinion in his dissent were read as suggesting that
the "compelling state interest test" was applicable to welfare cases because state-
created welfare classifications might deny persons the bare necessities of life.
Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doc-
trine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HAnv. L.
Rav. 1, 14 (1972). Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), dealing with a due
process issue, spoke of the "brutal need" of welfare recipients for the essentials of
food, clothing, housing and medical care provided by AFDC. Id. at 261. The
Court also viewed public assistance as more than charity, analogizing welfare en-
titlements to "property" rather than "gratuities." Id. at 262 n.8. The Goldberg
Court essentially withdrew the right-privilege distinction, at least in the welfare
area. Id. at 262.
29. 397 U.S. 471 (1970). Dandridge involved a suit against Maryland's maxi-
mum grant regulation of AFDC benefits as constituting an invidious discrimination
against large families in violation of equal protection. For discussions of Dandridge
and its impact see Tigar, The Supreme Court, 1969 Term-Foreword: Waiver of
Constitutional Rights: Disquiet in the Citadel, 84 HARv. L. RMv. 1, 60-71 (1970);
Comment, Legal Rights of AFDC Recipients After Rosado v. Wyman and Dan-
dridge v. Williams, 21 Am. U.L. REv. 207 (1971).
30. 397 U.S. at 485.
31. Id. at 486.
19741
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not vio-
late the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications
made by its laws are imperfect. If the classification has some "rea-
sonable basis," it does not offend the Constitution simply because
the classification "is not made with mathematical nicety or because
in practice it results in some inequality."3 2
According to Dandridge, this "reasonable basis" test should be applied
in the areas of economic and welfare regulation. 3
The courts have followed the Dandridge standard of evaluating
equal protection issues in welfare cases, further enunciating the states'
legitimate interests in apportioning their finite resources3 4 and reject-
ing any notion that a "fundamental right" is at stake.35 Unless "the
classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of
the State's objective,"38 the courts will not set aside the statute nor will
32. Id. at 485, quoting Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78
(1911).
33. 397 U.S. at 484-85. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 465 (1957), modified
somewhat the "traditional" equal protection test stated in Lindsley v. Natural
Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911), by adding the requirement that "a
statutory discrimination must be based on differences that are reasonably related to
the purposes of the Act in which it is found." Dandridge, however, appears to
restrict the additional requirement of Morey to a lesser standard in welfare cases:
whether any state of facts can reasonably be imagined to support the statute. See
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 508 (Marshall, J., dissenting); 35 ALBiA'NY
L. Rzv. 416 (1971). See also McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
There is, however, some suggestion that the Supreme Court may be revising its
approach to equal protection to conform more closely to the Morey standard by
adding the criterion of an "appropriate" governmental interest. See, e.g., Chicago
Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406
U.S. 164 (1972); Gunther, supra note 28, at 17-24.
34. Hagans v. Wyman, 471 F.2d 347 (2d Cir. 1973); accord, King v. Smith,
392 U.S. 309 (1968). Compare Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971), with
X v. McCorkle, 333 F. Supp. 1109 (D.N.J. 1970).
35. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); accord, Feinerman v. Jones,
356 F. Supp. 252 (M.D. Pa. 1973). The Feinerman court was reluctant to re-
cognize a right as "fundamental" unless it was set out in the Constitution. Cf.
People v. Olague, 31 Cal. App. 3d 5, 106 Cal. Rptr. 612 (Super. Ct. 1973). But
cf. Sawyer v. Sigler, 320 F. Supp. 690 (D. Neb. 1970) (intimating that the right to
medical treatment is a constitutional right and holding that the state cannot require
a person to choose between a statutory right and a constitutional right). See gen-
erally Koelfgen v. Jackson, 355 F. Supp. 243 (D. Minn. 1972); Comment, Legal
Rights of AFDC Recipients, supra note 29, at 215-16.
36. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961). See generally Feiner-
man v. Jones, 356 F. Supp. 252 (M.D. Pa. 1973).
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they substitute their own judgments or economic and social philoso-
phies for those of the state.3 7
The state has broad powers in the areas of economic and social
welfare and a wide range of discretion in the allocation of public
assistance funds.38 Courts and legislatures therefore recognize that
growing welfare rolls and dramatic increases in the costs of welfare
imperil the very future of welfare programs.39 Awareness of such reali-
ties has led the courts to uphold the right of the states to experiment
with these programs.40 The state is viewed as a "laboratory"'41 that has
a right to tackle the problems of the poor "one step at a time" 2 with-
out being subjected to a "constitutional straightjacket. ' ' 43
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Aguayo is con-
sistent with the present trend of welfare law and equal protection
adjudication. Following the Dandridge analysis, the court of appeals
refused to invoke a "strict scrutiny" test of equal protection despite the
fact that "the most basic economic needs of impoverished human
beings" 4 were at stake. Relying heavily on Dandridge and its progeny,
the court looked to several other developing equal protection stand-
ards,- but found that even under these stricter standards there was no
37. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); Rosado v. Wyman,
397 U.S. 397 (1970); Hagans v. Wyman, 471 F.2d 347 (2d Cir. 1973); Schwartz
v. Talmo, 295 Minn. 356, 205 N.W.2d 318 (1973).
38. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); Richardson v. Belcher,
404 U.S. 78 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); King v. Smith,
392 U.S. 309 (1968).
39. California Welfare Rights Organization v. Richardson, 348 F. Supp. 491
(N.D. Cal. 1972).
40. See California Welfare Rights Organization v. Richardson, 348 F. Supp.
491 (N.D. Cal. 1972); 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (1970). Compare McInnis v. Shapiro,
293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Il1. 1968), aff'd sub nom. McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S.
322 (1969), with Kaelin v. Warden, 334 F. Supp. 602 (E.D. Pa. 1971). See gen-
erally Horowitz & Neitring, Equal Protection Aspects of Inequalities in Public Ed-
ucation and Public Assistance Programs From Place to Place Within a State, 15
U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 787 (1968).
41. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
42. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 n.3 (1961). See generally Wil-
liamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of
Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608 (1935).
43. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546 (1972); Aguayo v. Richardson,
473 F.2d 1090, 1109 (1973), cert. denied, Aguayo v. Weinberger, 414 U.S. 1146
(1974).
44. 473 F.2d at 1109.
45. See note 33 supra.
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denial of equal protection in the implementation of PSWOP and IFI.
The right of the state to experiment in the welfare area controlled. 40
The state's right to experiment, however, was not challenged by
appellants. Rather, they were concerned with the manner in which the
state was experimenting. Claiming that certain AFDC recipients would
be forced to participate in the programs solely on the basis of their
residence, appellants objected to the state's geographic classification be-
cause residency was unrelated to the purposes of the AFDC program.47
Geographic classifications do not per se render a statute constitu-
tionally invalid.48 The state may create different classifications provided
they bear a rational relation to the statutory purpose. Thus, courts
have upheld statutes differentiating among citizens of different coun-
ties if there were differences among the counties that required or justi-
fied disparate treatment.49
The Aguayo court found that the program areas were selected in
order to provide an adequate sampling of welfare recipients of various
ethnic backgrounds as well as those from urban, suburban and rural
areas.50 Accordingly, the court determined that the classification was
neither arbitrary nor unreasonable by justifying it on the basis of the
purpose of the experiment rather than the purposes of the AFDC pro-
gram. 1 Appellants contended, however, that the areas were not chosen
46. 473 F.2d at 1109-10.
47. Brief for Appellants at 33-34, Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090 (1973);
Reply Brief for Appellants at 2, id. In Damico v. California, [1968-1971 Transfer
Binder] CCH PovERTY L. RzPP. 10,478 (N.). Cal. 1969), the federal district
court reasoned that the "paramount goal of the AFDC program was to fullfill the
subsistence needs of dependent children." Rothstein, Business as Usual?: The
Judicial Expansion of Welfare Rights, 50 J. URBAN L. 1, 12 (1972). 42 U.S.C. §
601 (1970) states that the purposes of the AFDC program are to
encourag[e] the care of dependent children in their own homes or in the homes
of relatives . .. to help maintain and strengthen family life and to help ...
parents or relatives to attain or retain capability for the maximum self-support
and personal independence consistent with the maintenance of continuing
parental care and protection.
48. See, e.g., Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964); McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545 (1954).
49. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Salsburg v. Mary-
land, 346 U.S. 545 (1954); Washington v. United States, 401 F.2d 915 (D.C.
Cir. 1968); Kaelin v. Warden, 334 F. Supp. 602 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Horowitz &
Neitring, supra note 40.
50. 473 F.2d at 1108-09.
51. According to the State, the purposes of the experimental programs were to
"determine whether [PSWOP and IFI were] administratively feasible or efficient,
[Val. 8:299
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because of any unique characteristics or needs, but precisely because
they were typical of the rest of the State in terms of welfare character-
istics. Therefore, the classification was not rational because it was
not reasonably related to "dependence, employability or potential for
self-support."' 2 The court disagreed, finding a random but rational
basis to the selection53 "The Equal Protection clause does not place a
state in a vise where its only choices in dealing with the problems of
welfare are to do nothing or plunge into statewide action."54
In holding that the programs did not deny equal protection, the
court relied on the limited duration and benevolent design of the ex-
periment, the broad powers of the state in economic and social areas,
and the hostile public attitude toward welfare.55 The court's analysis
implied that the state is to have the widest possible latitude in the
area of welfare experimentation and that equal protection does not
have the same meaning for welfare "guinea pigs" as it does for all
other classes of citizens.56
Apparently, for the purposes of equal protection analysis, "welfare"
has become a magic word. When welfare is involved, the courts tend to
and whether [they] modifie[d] the attitude of the public toward welfare." 473 F.2d
at 1105. The objectives of the particular projects, if they were successful, were to
employ able-bodied adult recipients, decrease welfare costs, increase the initiative,
self-respect and independence of recipients, and improve the public attitude toward
welfare. Id.
The sampling methodology was related to experimentation. Although experi-
mentation is not per se a purpose of AFDC, it is provided for in 42 U.S.C. § 1315
(1970). See notes 1, 7 supra.
52. Reply Brief for Appellants at 2, Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090 (2d
Cir. 1973). These three criteria are set out in the statement of purpose of the
AFDC program. 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1970).
53. 473 F.2d at 1109.
54. Id. at 1109-10.
55. Id. at 1103, 1108-10.
56. In fact, federal appellees implied in their brief that the experimental pro-
grams might well constitute a denial of equal protection, but that the constitutional
violation was justified because
the two demonstration programs . . . [were] not designed to maintain such
distinctions indefinitely. To the contrary, the programs [were] of limited dura-
tion and [were] intended only as pilot programs which as ultimately adopted,
if at all, (would] discard all distinctions based on geographical location and
[would] apply uniformly . . . to all AFDC recipients in the state.
Brief for Federal Appellees at 18, Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090 (2d Cir.
1973).
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apply only minimal scrutiny to the alleged discrimination.Fl Welfare
matters are too complex and the interests involved are too great 58 for
the courts to adopt automatically a "hands-off" approach in deferring
to legislative judgment. 9 Although the Aguayo court took note of
Justice Jackson's caveat in his concurring opinion in Railway Express
Agency, Inc. v. New York60 concerning the dangers of imposing laws
only upon a minority for reasons of political expediency, the court
found it inapplicable to PSWOP and IFI. 61 Yet, in light of the court's
emphasis on the hostile public attitude toward New York's welfare
system, it becomes apparent that the purpose of the experimental pro-
grams was to provide a panacea for the public's attitude rather than
a viable and effective welfare program for the poor.
Further, it may be questioned whether improving public attitudes
toward welfare is a legitimate state purpose that can justify the impo-
sition of additional burdens upon the receipt of public assistance.02
57. See Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546 (1972); Richardson v. Belcher,
404 U.S. 78, 80-81 (1971). In both of these cases, the Supreme Court refused to
subject welfare benefit allocations to strict scrutiny. See generally Schilb v. Kuebel,
404 U.S. 357 (1971); Gunther, supra note 28. The Supreme Court's decision in
Schilb, although not a welfare case, indicates that the Court will apply "minimal
scrutiny to legislation in areas ordinarily evoking sensitive review, where the legis-
lation is reformist in nature." Id. at 13 n.56.
58. The extent to which protection should be given to the "right" to welfare
benefits "depends upon whether the recipient's interest in avoiding that loss out-
weighs the governmental interest . . . ." Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263
(1970). The recipient's interest often is to obtain the bare necessities of life.
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
59. See generally O'Neil, Unconstitutional Conditions: Welfare Benefits with
Strings Attached, 54 CAL F. L. Rav. 443 (1966); Note, Legislative Purpose,
Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YA.LE L.J. 123 (1972). It also could be
argued that this and other welfare decisions reflect an abdication of judicial
responsibility.
60. 336 U.S. 106, 111 (1949). "[Tlhere is no more effective practical guaranty
against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that the principles
of law which officials would impose upon a minority must be imposed generally."
Id. at 112. Justice Jackson noted that the best way to invite such arbitrary action
was to "allow those officials to pick and choose only a few to whom they will apply
legislation and thus to escape the political retribution that might be visited upon
them if larger numbers were affected." Id. at 112-13; ef. California Welfare Rights
Organization v. Richardson, 348 F. Supp. 491, 495-96 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
61. 473 F.2d at 1109.
62. Justice Marshall, dissenting in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 508
(1970), argued that such a purpose was not consistent with nor within the purposes
of the Social Security Act.
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JUDICIAL RESPONSIBILITY
This question assumes even greater importance under a scrutiny of
"work for relief" programs 63 and their effectiveness. The real tragedy
of these two experimental programs is that they were modeled after the
federal WIN program that, by most standards, has been a failure."4
Generally, compulsory work programs have been expensive and un-
successful.15
The principal objections to these "work for relief" projects include
the inappropriateness of work provided, the programs' high cost rel-
ative to direct relief, and the lack of incentive from the money
they generate for participants.- Yet New York's experimental proj-
ects embodied all of these defects. It is highly unlikely that New York
could implement these programs on a statewide basis and still realize
its objective of decreasing the cost of welfare. Statewide implementa-
tion would require an increase in both the supervisory and administra-
tive manpower and the supportive services, such as child-care facilities.
It is doubtful whether New York could create enough jobs to make
statewide implementation feasible. Even though the programs were
unsound and unworkable, the court determined that additional and
substantial burdens upon welfare recipients were justified by the state's
right to experiment.
Taking into consideration the present state of the welfare system
and the states' legitimate interest in protecting the fiscal integrity of
their welfare programs, the states should be allowed to experiment.
The courts, however, in deciding whether a particular experiment is
constitutionally permissible, must look beyond the state's own interests.
Past failures and experiences coupled with the needs and interests of
welfare recipients also must be considered, rather than allowing the
courts to abdicate their responsibilities toward all the people.
Gayle L. CTose
63. See genera llt O'Neil, supra note 59. For a distinction between work relief
and work for relief programs see Rosenheim, Vagrancy Concepts in Welfare Law,
54 CALIF. L. REv. 511, 534 n.77 (1966). PSWOP and IFI clearly fall into the
latter category.
64. See 119 U. PA. L. REv. 485 (1971).
65. See 4 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 197 (1968). See generally Wedemeyer &
Moore, The American Welfare System, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 326 (1966).
66. See Rosenheim, supra note 63.
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